The discussion about the cost of a
pre-emptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities is valuable only if
intended to advance the attack and neutralize the possible retaliation
by Iran and its allies. However, such a discussion is harmful, ignores
precedents, plays into Iran's hands and threatens Israel's existence, if
it reflects hesitancy, skepticism and fatalism, aiming to preclude
preemption, and assuming that Israel can co-exist with a nuclear-armed
Iran.
On May 12, 1948, the pre-state Israeli Cabinet decided by a
vote of six to four to declare independence and include Jerusalem within
Israel's boundaries, despite internal opposition and pressure by the
U.S. and despite a terrible price: The U.S. withheld military aid,
threatened economic sanctions and surmised that the declaration of
independence would result in a second Holocaust, this time at the hands
of the Arabs. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion refused to abide by the
American pressure to postpone the declaration of independence by a few
years, knowing that such a delay would be tragic in the long run, and
that independence exacts a painful price.
On Oct. 5, 1973, the eve
of the Yom Kippur War, Prime Minister Golda Meir rejected the option of
a pre-emptive strike to repel the clear and present danger of a joint
Egyptian-Syrian attack. She was concerned about the cost of such a
strike -- namely appearing as the aggressor and severely damaging ties
with the U.S. -- and preferred to be portrayed as the victim. However,
the terrible, long-term cost of that war has been far greater than
pre-emptive action would have been. As expected, Israel was not viewed
as a victim, but rather as a country that lost the "spirit of the
Six-Day War," eroding is own deterrent power, and undermining its
position as a strategic asset for the U.S.
In June 1981, on the
eve of the destruction of the nuclear reactor in Iraq, then Prime
Minister Menachem Begin weighed the cost of a pre-emptive strike versus
the cost of inaction. The heads of the Mossad and Military Intelligence,
former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, opposition leader Shimon Peres,
Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Yadin, Israel's national security adviser
and the Head of the Atomic Energy Commission all opposed striking Iraq.
They presented apocalyptic scenarios that would result from such action:
an irreparable rift with the U.S., harsh sanctions, conflict with the
Soviet Union and Western Europe, reconciliation between Muslim countries
and a pan-Islamic attack, threats to the peace treaty with Egypt and
other doomsday events. They underestimated the probability of a
successful pre-emptive attack and overestimated Iraq's military
capabilities. Some claimed there was a greater chance of seeing Israeli
pilots being dragged through the streets of Baghdad than being welcomed
back to their bases. But, Begin decided in favor of a pre-emptive
strike, determining that the cost of restraint could be far greater than
that of a pre-emptive strike; that a nuclear threat would subordinate
Israel both politically and militarily; that a nuclear attack could not
be ruled out considering the violent, unpredictable and hateful nature
of regimes in the region, and that the ratio of Israeli territory to
that of surrounding Arab states (0.2%) did not allow for a Mutual
Assured Destruction. Begin understood that the window of opportunity for
a strike against Iraq's nuclear reactor was about to close. The
destruction of the reactor drew short-term isolation, which was promptly
substituted by a long-term strategic esteem and cooperation.
In
2012, after a decade of failed attempts at engagement and sanctions, and
in light of the assistance (in terms of development and acquisition)
Iran has received from Pakistan, North Korea, Russia and China for its
nuclear program, Israel must decide between launching a pre-emptive
attack to eliminate that threat or facing it. Opponents of an attack
warn that it could potentially result in a harsh response from Iran,
Hezbollah and Hamas, and international anger directed at Israel over
higher oil prices, a wave of terror and Persian Gulf turbulence. Yet,
these pale in comparison to the lethal cost of a nuclear threat, which
includes a withdrawal of overseas and Israeli investors from the
country, a record number of Israeli emigrants and a sharp decline of
Aliya (Jewish immigration), dwindling tourism, intensification of
military-political-economic dependence on the U.S., a more powerful and
influential Iranian regime that takes control of the Persian Gulf , and
the transformation of Israel from a strategic asset to a strategic
liability. Israel would wither without even one nuclear warhead needing
to be launched.
A pre-emptive attack against Iran would exert
non-lethal and short-term cost, but would boost Israel's long-term
strategic image. It would also provide a tailwind for the opposition to
the ayatollahs' regime. Will Israel embrace the legacy of Ben-Gurion and
Begin, or that of their opponents?
Ambassador (ret.) Yoram Ettinger
The Ettinger Report
"Second Thought: A US-Israel Initiative"
First published in "Israel Hayom" newsletter, January 31, 2012
