Imagine the reaction if, having botched the Iraq War, President Bush asked Congress for even greater powers as Commander in Chief. He would rightly be laughed out of Washington.

Because of a comparably disastrous record on trade policy, the President’s recent request that Congress renew his sweeping authority to negotiate new international trade agreements deserves the same response.

Congress’ current system of granting presidents trade negotiating authority, which began in 1974, not only permitted them to seek deals like the North American Free Trade Agreement and the global pact that created the World Trade Organization. They were designed to boost the odds of formal Congressional approval by prohibiting all amendments and sharply limiting debate - a practice known as "fast-tracking."

These procedures - still unique in American governance - have satisfied Congress’ desire to pass the buck, presidential wishes for a blank check, and the determination of both to shut domestic interests out of the trade policy process.

Yet this cozy quid pro quo is unconstitutional - since the Founding Fathers designated Congress as the U.S. government’s trade policy kingpin precisely because it’s the branch closest to the people. The economic effects of these expedited procedures, moreover, have been devastating.

During the Bush years alone, fast-tracked trade deals helped produce nearly $3.6 trillion in cumulative U.S. trade deficits. The second-ranking U.S. trade negotiator recently made clear the connection: "From Chile to Singapore to Mexico, the history of our FTAs [Free Trade Agreements] is that bilateral trade surpluses of our trading partners go up."

The reason? With manufacturers and farmers devoted to production in America and their representatives excluded from decision-making, the vacuum has been filled by diplomats fond of giving away chunks of the U.S. market to make and keep allies, and by multinational companies bent on maximizing short-term profits by supplying their American customers from super-cheap, regulation-free countries like China.

The resulting deficits are saddling Americans with astronomical and rapidly rising debts. They also force the nation to sell off more and increasingly valuable assets in order to keep consuming much more than it produces.

In addition, the soaring deficits and Washington’s longstanding failure to control them depress U.S. output, employment, and living standards. They track how successfully foreign-made products - often heavily subsidized by foreign governments - have been grabbing ever more of the U.S. market, and how successfully foreign barriers continue blocking the sale abroad of U.S.-produced goods and services. Both trends keep abnormally low the demand for these domestic products, and for the Americans who make them - one key reason that three million U.S. manufacturing jobs have vanished during Bush’s presidency, and that the median wage has stagnated.

The deals produced by fast-tracking trade are endangering global financial stability as well. Collectively, they have addicted the rest of the world to growing by exporting to the United States. At the same time, the unprecedented excess of U.S. consumption they have encouraged over U.S. production is weakening America’s ability to play this role - to pay for its consumption responsibly, through earnings instead of borrowing. Thus, even a soft landing for the U.S. economy - which grows less likely the longer it is postponed - could produce a deep, protracted global slump.

Supporters of fast-tracking trade insist that other countries would refuse to negotiate trade deals with the United States if Congress regains the ability to change the president’s handiwork. Yet with its immense market remaining the grand prize of any significant international trade talks, no one can afford to shun the United States.

Rejecting fast-tracking is an essential first step toward turning trade policy from an adversary into an ally of the domestic productive base - the ultimate source of America’s prosperity and security. It’s also vital to administering the tough love the world trade system needs to strengthen its dangerously shaky foundations.

Alan Tonelson, Research Fellow at the U.S. Business & Industry Council in Washington, D.C., is a contributor to the AmericanEconomicAlert.org website and the author of The Race to the Bottom (Westview Press, 2002).